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Threatening Drones
by
j o s e p h V. V a c e k

HOW TO ANSWER WHEN YOUR CLIENT ASKS:
“CAN I SHOOT DOWN THAT DRONE?”
There are now more than three
times as many drones operating legally
in the US as manned aircraft. Clearly,
the drone industry has succeeded in
entering the US airspace and is poised
to continue to grow. With that explosive
growth comes a particular problem:
some uses of drones are nuisances,
intrusions onto other legal rights, or
even criminal acts. Currently, federal
law under 18 USC 32 categorically
prohibits destruction or interference
with any aircraft, which includes a
drone.3
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SOME DRONE OPERATIONS HAVE
EVOLVED INTO A THREAT
From delivery of contraband to
corporate espionage, drones have been
found to be useful tools in wrongdoing
and crime. Even international terrorist
groups such as ISIS have used drones
to facilitate their activities. The threats
posed by misanthropic or criminal
use of drones can be categorized into
physical hazards and cyber hazards.
Small drones may pose a small
but potentially significant threat to
1 The original long form heavily cited academic
version of this article is published and copyrighted
by the North Dakota Law Review, Issue 93:3.
Available: https://law.und.edu/law-review. This
article omits lengthy discussion of a proposed
autonomous counter UAS system, for which the
author has a patent pending.
2
3 Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730
(2014).

passenger carrying aircraft,4 and their
mass (up to 55 lbs) combined with
velocity (up to 100 mph) results in
potentially lethal force in the event of
a direct collision with a human, or at
least significant injury from the impact
or cuts from rotating blades. Even
though the probability of a catastrophic
collision between a drone and an
occupied aircraft is thought to be quite
low,5 the consequences of such a low
probability event would be severe,
potentially resulting in hundreds of
deaths, both of passengers and people
on the ground. Much more probable
than a small drone collision with a jet is
a small drone creating a safety hazard
to those near or below it when it is
operated recklessly at a low altitude.
The author of this paper recalls being
out for a walk through a public park
when a highly modified racing drone
“buzzed” him at less than 10 feet. The
author observed the operator to be
using First Person View goggles to
control it, without an additional visual
observer, and in a congested area
below trees where several people
were exposed to the threat.
Less immediately threatening
but much more generally risky to
the population as a whole are cyber
intrusions facilitated by drone. An easily
4 UAS Airborne Collision Severity Evaluation
2017 ASSURE http://www.assureuas.org/projects/
deliverables/sUASAirborneCollisionReport.php
5 UAS Airborne Collision Severity Evaluation
2017 ASSURE http://www.assureuas.org/projects/
deliverables/sUASAirborneCollisionReport.php

Threatening Drones
...continued

grasped example of such a risk was the
demonstration of a drone-enabled hack
of a printer on the 30th floor of an office
building. Researchers in Singapore
in 2015 coupled a smartphone to
a drone, tasked the phone with
impersonating a wi-fi connection, flew
the drone up to the 30th floor where the
printer was located, and intercepted
confidential documents being sent
to the printer.6 Such use of drones
as mobile electronic espionage units
are alarmingly common, to such an
extent that an entire cottage industry
has developed detection and alerting
systems to combat such espionage.
The incredibly accurate and
detailed imagery and other remotely
sensed data obtainable by small
drones7 poses an additional risk to
critical infrastructure. The unique
perspective offered by a drone
operating at up to several hundred
feet coupled with very high resolution
stabilized cameras allows anyone-knowingly or unknowingly--to obtain
detailed data for critical infrastructure,
such as dams, electrical transmission
systems, power generation facilities,
airports, public safety agencies
and assets, and military hardware
locations.8
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6 Wired https://www.wired.com/2015/10/dronesrobot-vacuums-can-spy-office-printer/
7 See Vacek, Remote Sensing of Private Data
By Drones Is Mostly Unregulated: Reasonable
Expectations of Privacy Are At Risk Absent
Comprehensive Federal Legislation. 90:3 NDLR
463 (2014).
8 https://www.techspot.com/news/72136-dronemanufacturer-dji-accused-spying-us-criticalinfrastructure.html

Clearly, the capability to easily
obtain the tools that allow bad actors
to gain access to or information about
critical infrastructure or private data
is potentially devastating. The risks
posed to air traffic and people below
from recklessly operated drones is also
significant. People also generally dislike
the idea of drones compromising their
privacy.9 Together, threatening drone
operations have raised the question
of countering those threats, and at
least one case of note responding to a
perceived threat from a drone by use
of force has already occurred.10
COUNTER UAS IS PROHIBITED
UNDER 18 USC 32.
Federal law currently prohibits
any counter UAS (CUAS) activity
beyond detection, tracking, and
notification of the intrusion. The 3
relevant sections of 18 USC 32 to
CUAS state that “Whoever willfully sets
fire to, damages, destroys, disables,
or wrecks any aircraft in the special
aircraft jurisdiction of the United States
or any civil aircraft used, operated, or
employed in interstate, overseas, or
foreign air commerce11...interferes with
or disables, with intent to endanger the
safety of any person or with a reckless
disregard for the safety of human
life12,....communicates
information,
knowing the information to be false
and under circumstances in which
9 https://www.marketwatch.com/story/surprisingdrone-study-shows-how-people-really-feel-aboutdrones-2015-11-11
10
Boggs v. Meredith https://regmedia.
co.uk/2017/03/24/drone.pdf
11 18 USC 32(a)(1)
12 18 USC 32(a)(5)
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such information may reasonably be
believed, thereby endangering the
safety of any such aircraft in flight13...
shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years
or both.14
As a preliminary matter, the
question of whether a UAS is actually an
aircraft subject to 18 USC 32 and other
federal laws and regulations governing
the use, operation, and responsibility
for the operation of aircraft, as well as
federal jurisdiction over such aircraft,
has been answered in the affirmative.15
Since Pirker, regulations as to the
operating rules for small UAS have
been promulgated16 and a registration
scheme has been attempted. With the
definitional status of UAS, specifically
small UAS (less than 55 lbs) settled,
enforcement of regulation and policing
and enforcement of rulebreakers
becomes pressing, especially so
considering the rapid growth of small
UAS operations. The relevant question
is what defenses are available to
property owners or people against
UAS intruders when UAS operators
violate their property rights or threaten
their physical safety. At first glance, 18
USC 32 appears to prevent any such
self-help measures, but at least three
potential exceptions exist due to the
special nature of UAS operations.
While the relevant language of
18 USC 32 appears to categorically
prohibit destruction or interference with
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13 18 USC 32(a)(7)
14 18 USC 32(a)(8)
15 Huerta v. Pirker https://www.ntsb.gov/legal/alj/
OnODocuments/Aviation/5730.pdf
16 14 CFR 107 et seq

an aircraft, the specific prohibitions
were drafted to apply to manned
aircraft and arguably leave open the
possibility of some exceptions for
CUAS as currently written, as long as
the CUAS process and actions are
reasonable. The possible exceptions
for CUAS are related to actions that
are simply impossible to execute upon
manned aircraft. They are (1) partial
temporary disablement by electronic
means; (2) interference or disablement
unrelated to safety of human lives; and
(3) communicating false information
to a UAS that does not endanger the
safety of the aircraft.
Partial temporary
electronic means

disablement

by

18 USC 32(a)(1) criminalizes
a number of actions directed towards
aircraft; the list includes fire, damage,
destruction, disablement, or wrecking.
Words are known by the company they
keep,17 and all of the listed statutory
actions result in significant harm to an
aircraft and would put it to some degree
in a state of emergency or at least
urgency. An intruding drone subject
to a CUAS system that triggers the
drone’s “return to base” function, for
example, has indeed been disabled as
to its original planned flight, but is not
damaged, destroyed, or even disabled.
Such a command is similar to an air
traffic control clearance to an airliner
that directs the pilots to a different
destination (to avoid bad weather,
for example) and is not equivalent to
the category of harm intended by the
statute. The intruder drone simply
17 “noscitur a sociis”
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follows the new command and returns
to its base, which it would also do
automatically if it lost its communication
link with its operator or the operator
could command if the operator lost
awareness of the drone’s location.
But a CUAS system’s interference by
commanding a return to base function
is still an interference, which implicates
18 USC 32(a)(5).
Interference or disablement unrelated
to safety of human lives
18 USC 32(a)(5) prohibits
interference or disablement of an
aircraft with intent to endanger the
safety of any person or with a reckless
disregard for the safety of human
life. The disablement issue has been
treated above, and a CUAS system
command to return to base is clearly
interference. However, as long as the
safety of any person on the ground
(since UAS are not piloted and carry
no passengers) is not endangered or
recklessly disregarded, it appears that
interference such as that described
would not be proscribed by the statute.
What CUAS actions do not endanger
safety or recklessly disregard human
lives is a question of fact and of
reasonableness.
Communicating false information to a
UAS that does not endanger the safety
of the aircraft.
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18 USC 32(a)(7) prohibits
“communicating false information to an
aircraft knowing the information to be
false and under circumstances in which
such information may reasonably be

believed, thereby endangering the
safety of any such aircraft in flight.”18
A return to base command given by a
CUAS system is an intrusion into the
communication channels between the
drone and the operator, and would be
a false command under the statute,
because the operator did not give the
command. Since the drone obeyed the
CUAS “false” command and returned
to base, such an action violates the
first part of 18 USC 32(a)(7). Similar
to the analysis above, however,
endangerment is also a required
element. Here, endangerment is tied to
the aircraft’s safety rather than human
safety. As long as the CUAS command
does not override the drone’s normal
if
safety-compliance
software,19
installed, or cause an accident, this part
of the statute is probably not violated,
either.
DEFENSIVE
AVAILABLE

MEASURES

ARE

CUAS includes a range of
technological defenses, either passive
or active. Passive detection and
tracking of intruding drones, as well
as alerting the property owner or the
police, do not violate 18 USC 32 as
such actions fall outside the scope of
the statute. Active countermeasures
may implicate 18 USC 32 but fall
into a defensible exception from the
statute as discussed above or may
clearly violate the statute. Should
an active CUAS action such as an
electromagnetic pulse, frequency jam,
18 18 USC 32(a)(7)
19 such as geofenced areas or optical detection and
avoidance of obstacles
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or physical incapacitation or destruction
of the drone occur, it more than likely
violates 18 USC 32, as well as FCC
regulations. However, the justifications
of defense of property, self-defense,
or necessity may cover such CUAS
action if the actions were objectively
reasonable.
The justification defenses of
Defense of Property, Self Defense,
and Necessity are justifications of
conduct that, while violative of law
on their own, are allowable because
the wrongfulness of the original act
outweighs the wrongfulness of the
defensive act. Justification of Defense
of Property exists when a person
uses “reasonable force to protect
his property from trespass or theft,
when he reasonably believes that his
property is in immediate danger of
such an unlawful interference and that
the use of such force is necessary to
avoid that danger.”20 The amount of
force used to defend property must be
reasonable, i.e. “It is not reasonable to
use any force at all if the threatened
danger to property can be avoided by
a request to the other to desist from
interfering with the property.”21 The
Model Penal Code requires a person to
make a request to desist before using
force, unless that would be useless or
dangerous.22
Justification of Self Defense
exists when a person who is not an

PA G E
PA G E

13

20 2 LaFave Substantive Criminal Law 2d, Sec.
10.6 (2003).
21 Id. at 10.6(a) citing State v. Cessna, 153 N.W.
194 (1915), State v. Woodward, 50 N.H. 527
(1871).
22 3.06(3)(a)

aggressor uses “a reasonable amount
of force against his adversary when
he reasonably believes (a) that he is
in immediate danger of unlawful bodily
harm from his adversary and (b) that
the use of such force is necessary
to avoid this danger.”23 While there
is much nuance in the law regarding
the duty to retreat,24 imminence of
attack,25 or injuries to 3rd persons,26
those considerations apply to other
persons, not to objects like drones.
While defending oneself against a
drone might conceivably result in
injury to a 3rd person, this analysis is
focused solely on the question of the
applicability of justification defenses to
CUAS under 18 USC 32.
Justification
of
Necessity
exists when “the defendant chooses
the lesser of two evils and thus, by
bringing about the lesser harm, avoids
the greater harm.”27
A balancing
of the harm avoided with the harm
done must be performed28 and the
defendant must intend to avoid harm.29
Objectively, the value of the harm
avoided must be greater than the harm
done,30 there must be no reasonable
alternatives31 and the defendant must
not have brought about the situation.32
Depending on the circumstances of
23 2 LaFave Substantive Criminal Law 2d, Sec.
10.4 (2017).
24 Id at 10.4(f)
25 Id at 10.4(d)
26 Id at 10.4(g)
27 Id at 10.1(d)
28 Id at 10.1(d)1-(d)2.
29 Id at 10.1(d)3
30 Id at 10.1(d)4
31 Id at 10.1(d)5
32 Id at 10.1(d)6
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an intruding drone, any one of the
enumerated justifications may apply.
ADVICE FOR YOUR CLIENTS
Any of the above justifications
may apply in a given context, and
the nexus of a client’s question and
an analysis of which justification is
defensible is purely academic without
a plan of action. From earlier in this
article, the three exceptions identified
in 18 USC 32 are (1) partial temporary
disablement by electronic means; (2)
interference or disablement unrelated
to safety of human lives; and (3)
communicating false information to
a UAS that does not endanger the
safety of the aircraft. Currently, FCC
regulations prohibit the use of electronic
frequency jamming.33 Some electronic
CUAS technology manufacturers
distinguish their products from
prohibited broadband jammers by
employing “software defined radio,” the
operation of which, arguably, does not
violate FCC jamming rules because of
its specific function.34
The best plan of action for your
client would be to first advise them to
deploy some kind of passive drone
sensor system to determine the extent
of the problem. Once they have data,
their next step would be to decide
whether to incorporate some kind of
CUAS system on top of the sensor
system. Depending on your clients’
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33 https://www.fcc.gov/general/jammer-enforcement
34
https://www.defensenews.com/digital-showdailies/navy-league/2018/04/10/this-gun-shootsdrones-out-of-the-sky/

choice of system, use the above
analysis to advise them whether their
plan would be defensible under 18
USC 32 and whether it runs afoul of
FCC’s jamming rules. Finally, advise
them to keep meticulous records,
and archive any data from the sensor
or CUAS system in case the need to
raise one of the affirmative defenses
discussed above arises.
CONCLUSION
Explosive growth of UAS use
by companies small and large and
general consumers brings problems of
nuisances, intrusions onto legal rights,
or even criminal acts. While 18 USC
32 prohibits destruction or interference
with any aircraft, including drones, this
article provides explanation of how
countermeasures may be justified
using the defenses of defense of
property, self-defense, or necessity.
Any such counter UAS actions must
be reasonable in response to the threat
level for a justification to be reasonably
defensible, and a client’s particular
choice of CUAS system may implicate
FCC jamming regulations, depending
on how it operates.

